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UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
IN WISCONSIN
JUSTIN C. SMITH*
INTRODUCTION**
The unfair labor practice provisions of the Wisconsin Employment
Peace Act' have been in operation since May, 1939, with the result that
it would seem appropriate at this time to inquire into their effect on
labor management relations in Wisconsin. Although extremely contro-
versial in nature, the unfair labor practice sections of the Ace have, in
the past, received relatively little attention from writers.3 To a certain
extent this oversight may be explained by the fact that heretofore little
or nothing has been collected in the way of primary materials. Also, in
view of the fact that the legislation was drafted by a private attorney
and that no record was kept of the debate on the measure in either the
Assembly or Senate, no formal legislative history is available for criti-
cal study.4 However, an earlier article sought to identify the forces re-
sponsible for drafting Bill 54,A5 as well as reconstruct the circumstances
surrounding the passage of the legislation. 6
The writing of this article was preceded by a two-year field study of
the Peace Act, estimating how the legislation has functioned in practice
as compared with the pronounced anticipations of the Act's sponsors.
Where practicable, individual and group opinions gained through con-
frontations have been preserved in the text in the hope that these ex-
pressions may be of interest to those seeking to evaluate the Act's im-
pact on labor-management relations.
Although no definite cut off date has been adhered to, by and large
this discussion has been limited to decisions and events arising during
*Professor of Law, Western Reserve University Law School, Cleveland, Ohio.
** Ed. Note. This article is part one of a two part series. Part two will appear
in the next issue of the Marquette Law Review.
'Wis. STAT. ch. 111 (1959).
2WIS. STAT. §111.06 (1959).
3 The exception being A Study of the Wisconsin Emnployment Peace Act-The
Selection of Collective Bargaining Representatives, 1956 Wis. L. REv. 283;
Part Il-Union Security, 1956 Wis. L. REv. 481; Part Ill-Unfair Labor
Practices 1957 Wis. L. REv. 136.
4 For a detailed description of the role of the Wisconsin Council on Agriculture
Co-operatives in drafting the "Peace Act" see: Smith, The Background and
Events Leading Up to the Passage of the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act,
12 LAB. L. J. 23 (1961).
5 Ibid. See also: Swanton, Review of the Role of the Wisconsin Council on
Agriculture Concern About Labor Relations in Wisconsin, (a statement pre-
pared by the Council's executive secretary on file in the council's office in
Madison, Wisconsin).6 Supra note 4. See also: Memorandum by Walter Bender, Answers to Specific
Objections to Bill No. 154A, presented at a hearing before Joint Finance Com-
mittee on April 12, 1939, on file with the Wisconsin Council of Agriculture
Co-operative, Madison, Wisconsin.
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the first twenty years of the existence of section 111.06. It is hoped that
periodically, perhaps, at ten-year intervals, others will extend this study.
Because the legislature in passing this act in 1939 anticipated broad
changes in our national labor policy (which were to await the 19477
and 19598 amendments to the National Labor Relations Act), the whole
scheme of the W.E.P.A. seemed at odds with both labor's announced
goals and the Wagner Act. Thus the "Peace Act," unlike its predecessor,
the Wisconsin Labor Relations Act, 9 provides certain sanctions against
labor as well as against management for violation of the statutorily es-
tablished code.
The W.E.P.A.'s legislative sponsors, speaking through the Act's
draftsman, stated the rational behind these provisions thusly:
The present law describes unfair labor practices on the part of the
employer but says nothing in reference to unfair labor practices
on the part of employees. Without in any way accusing the great
mass of employees in this state of doing acts which are unfair
in labor disputes, it must be admitted by all that there have been
many instances in recent years of acts of this character. As stated
at the outset, this bill aims to protect as fully as may be expected
the rights of the public. This being true, it follows that the bill
must define and forbid acts which constitute unfair practices on
the part of employees just as it defines and forbids acts of this
character on the part of employers. Furthermore, it should for-
bid any such acts when done by third parties on behalf of either
the employer or the employee. This section is designed to meet
these requirements and defines unfair labor practices by anyone
of these groups.'0
Thus, it appears from the outset that those responsible for the Act
were concerned with the interest of three often irreconcilable interests:
those of the public, labor and management.
Some insight as to how the Act sought to recognize these interests
and treat them may now be had by looking to the provision of the Act
and their application in practice.
1. EMPLOYER UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
a. Restrain or Coercion of Employees. Section 111.06(1) (a) pro-
vides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer "to inter-
fere with, restrain or coerce his employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 111.04." This subsection is substantially identical
with a similar provision in the WLRA, and it needs no comment here.
7Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§151-166(1958).SLabor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29
U.S.C.A. §§401-531 (1960 Supp.).
9 Wis. LAWS 1937, ch. 51; Wis. STAT. ch. 111 (1937), repeated by Wis. LAWS
1939, ch. 57.
10 Walter Bender, Commentary on Wisconsin Einployment Peace Act, on file with
the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board (hereinafter cited as Conimen-
tary).
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b. Domination and Support of Labor Organizations. In restricting
employer activities, the act states that employers shall not "initiate, cre-
ate, dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any
labor organization or contribute financial support to it." However, it
it also provides that employers shall not be prohibited from paying em-
ployees at the prevailing rate of pay, from conferring with their em-
ployees, nor from cooperating with representatives of at least a ma-
jority of the employer's employees. Thus, by statute the employer is
free to open his plant to a majority union, at their request, for organi-
zational and other activities, provided that in so doing the company does
not incur any additional expense.
Field interviews indicated that this particular provision of the act,
although generally favored by labor, is seldom invoked.
By allowing an employer to open his plant to the majority union for
meetings, the act sought to lessen the economic burden facing employee
organizations and to insure the best possible attendance at union
meetings.
Very few decisions have arisen out of sections 111.06(1) (a) and
(b)-which should be read together. While the boundaries of permis-
sible employer conduct must be defined by the facts in each case, the
Board has held that the organization by the employer of a shop council
for the purpose of meeting from time to time on the employer's prem-
ises to discuss working conditions does not constitute an unfair labor
practice.:' However, in a matter decided some two and one-half years
later the Board concluded that the act does preclude an employer from
negotiating individual contracts containing a provision that the em-
ployees should form their own union, when the employer had knowl-
edge of an existing majority union.'2
A more difficult problem is presented by the prohibition against em-
ployer interference with the administration of a union of the employees'
own choosing. This point was raised in the A. L. Shafton Co. case"
wherein the Board held that it was an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer to refuse to negotiate with a union until the membership had
selected another representative as its bargaining agent. During the same
period the Board further indicated that it may be an unfair labor prac-
tice for an employer to threaten to close his plant if a union won a
forthcoming election,' 4 reasoning that such a threat constituted an inter-
ference with the formation and administration of a labor organization.
"I Northwestern Engraving Co., WERB Dec. No. 50, (1940).
12 John Kadow, Inc., WERB Dec. No. 440 (1942), afT'd, Manitowoc Cty. Cir. Ct.
(Sept. 1942).
13A. L. Shafton Co., WERB Dec. No. 2041 (1949).
'14 Winneconne Stamping Co., WERB, Dec. No. 2044 (1949).
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Although originally considered a potential trouble spot, in practice
sections 111.06 (1) (a) and (b) have proven neither troublesome nor the
basis for conduct at variance with the purpose of the statute.
c. Encouragement or Discouragement of Membership in a Labor
Organization. The act makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer
to encourage or discourage membership in a labor organization. In cer-
tain cases the act spells out an exception and permits execution of an
"all-union" agreement where (1) two-thirds of the voting employees of
an appropriate bargaining unit have voted affirmatively by secret ballot
in favor of executing such agreement, and (2) those voting for the
agreement constitute at least a majority of such unit.15 The validity of
the executed "all-union" agreement is made conditional on the union's
receiving as a member any employee of the employer.
Additional provisions are incorporated into this subsection to handle
the situation where, subsequently, "there is reasonable ground to believe
that there exists a change in the attitude of the employees concerned
toward the 'all-union' agreement."
An early judicial construction16 of sectiion 111.06(1)(c) sum-
marizes the Board's interpretation with respect to encouragement or
discouragement of union membership. Here the court held that the dis-
charge of an employee under the supposition, either rightfully or wrong-
fully, that such employee was engaging in union activities in a dis-
criminatory discharge under the act.
Numerous Board decisions have followed this decision, and all have
supported the basic proposition that discharge for alleged union activi-
ties is an unfair labor practice. In discussions of discriminatory dis-
charge matters with representatives of the Board, it has been noted that
the policy of the Board is to act as rapidly as possible in these cases in
order that (a) "the employee be restored to gainful employment and a
pay check as soon as possible," and (b) the assessment of damages
against the employer, i.e., back pay awardable to the discriminatorily
discharged employee, be kept to a minimum. Unfortunately, in the ma-
jority of instances in which an employee has been reinstated, the em-
ployee, realizing that his employment relation will henceforth be
strained, does not choose to continue working for the employer against
whom the charges were brought.
The mechanics and decisions of the Board relating to the referen-
dum aspect of section 111.06(1)(c) have received ample treatment
from Hugh G. Hafer, writing in the Wisconsin Law Review.17 No at-
tempt is made to duplicate this work. Needless to say, the referendum
provisions of the act are extremely important.
15 Wis. STAT. §111.06(1) (a) (1957).
16 Century Building Co. v. WERB, 235 Wis. 376, 291 N.W. 305 (1940).
17 Comment, 1956 Wis. L. REv. 481.
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A recent decision of the Board interpreting the voidability of an
"all-union" agreement by virtue of the union's failure to receive as a
member an employee of the employer does, however, merit close scrutiny.
The case, Appleton Photo Engravers Union #77,1 8 involved a com-
plaint brought by an employee of an employer operating under an "all-
union" agreement with a local of the International Photo Engravers
Union of North America. The facts are that the employee was in every
way qualified for admittance to the union and that his employer re-
garded his work as superior. However, the union twice declined the
complainant's application for membership, giving several reasons for
its refusals, some pertaining to the man's personal life.
The Board in its conclusions of law found that (a) the respondent
had unreasonably denied the complainant membership in the union with-
in the meaning of section 111.06(1) (c) (1) of the Wisconsin statutes and
ordered that the "all-union" agreement to which the union was a party
be set aside in 20 days unless in the interim it accepted the complainant
as a "regular and bona fide journeyman member." In its accompanying
memorandum the Board noted:
We cannot make the Complainant whole for the wages he lost as
the result of the discrimination he has suffered at the hands of
Local 77 and with the consent, no matter how reluctant, of the
Marathon Corporation, since our statutes afford no such relief
when labor organizations have wrongfully caused loss of employ-
ment under union security agreements where there has been no
complaint filed against the employer.
Thus the Board has clearly announced that section 111.06(1) (c) (1)
requires that a union operating under an "all-union" agreement accept
for membership all qualified employees of the employer. Similarly it
would appear that an action may be brought under this subsection even
if the employee's real purpose in seeking admittance is to utilize his
"card" in obtaining employment in another community in the state.
Section 111.06(1) (c) (2) states that no petition by an employer for
a referendum shall be entertained by the Board unless the employer has
an agreement with the majority union in the collective bargaining unit
that he will enter into an "all-union" agreement upon approval by his
employees expressed in said referendum.
The Act's draftsmen, in including this provision, assured organized
labor that an employer would not be free to poll the union's strength
through a Board-held referendum and then refuse to execute such
agreement should the poll show that the overwhelming majority of his
employees favor such an agreement.
18 WERB Dec. No. 4187-A (1956).
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The most recent statistics of the Board 19 indicate that during the
period from July 1, 1959, through June 30, 1960, organized labor won
135 referenda, representing 75 per cent of all referenda held during
that period.
Field interviews have indicated that for the most part both labor and
management have found section 111.06(1) (c) workable, although labor
has indicated that it feels the two-thirds balloting requirement should be
reduced to a simple majority of those voting. When questioned speci-
fically as to whether or not labor would move for such a reduction in
the voting requirements, spokesmen for organized labor indicated that
they doubted if sufficient strength could be found in the legislature for
such a revision.
d. Refusal to Bargain Collectively. Sectiton 111.06(1) (d) makes it
an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively
with a majority of his employees in a collective bargaining unit. How-
ever, the act further states that an employer shall not be deemed guilty
of an unfair labor practice if he files with the Board a petition for a
representation election, for the purpose of having the Board certify to
him the name of the union, if there be one, representing the majority
of his employees in the collective bargaining unit.
In view of Mr. Hafer's coverage of the Selection of Collective
Bargaining Representatives,20 this discussion is limited to Board de-
cisions, judicial construction of the subsection, and pertinent facts re-
vealed in the interviews. It will be recalled that matters relating to
representatives and elections are covered in section 111.05 of the act,
while section 111.06(1) (d), which we are now considering, covers un-
fair labor practice charges against employers refusing to bargain col-
lectively with their employees.
(1) Conditions precedent to employer's duty to bargain. The unfair
labor practice provisions apply if the employer has either actual or con-
structive knowledge of the union's majority status; thus in Appleton
Chair Corporation,2 the court held that the corporation by failing to
bargain with the union after a Board certification violated the act. The
act does not, however, require that the employer receive any written
notice of a union's majority. Once an employer has constructive knowl-
edge of a representative's majority status, the employer has a duty to
recognize the union as the bargaining agent. 22
It would also appear that once employees have selected a labor or-
ganization to represent them through an NLRB-conducted election, that
19 Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, Twenty-Second Annual Report
(1961).
20 Comment, 1956 Wis. L. REv. 283.
21 Appleton Chair Corp. v. United Brotherhood, 239 Wis. 337, 1 N.W. 2d 188
(1941).
22 Stowe Plastic Products Co., Milwaukee Co. Cir. Ct., (1951).
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organization will continue to represent the majority of the employees
until termination by some legally effective manner.23
(2) Employer's duty to meet and negotiate. In general, an employer
has a duty to meet with the certified representatives of his employees,
to listen to proposals, and to consider any counter offers which they may
make ;24 the employer is under no obligation to grant requests made by
union representatives in a bargaining conference. 25
In practice this subsection has caused little concern on the part of
either labor or management. Because the parties' rights and obligations
are easily ascertainable, this section seldom comes up for Board inter-
pretation. In only one known instance, during the course of a bargaining
session in an up-state woodworking plant, has a labor organization
threatened to file charges for refusal to bargain under this section.
e. Bargaining Collectively With Less Than a Majority. Having af-
firmatively stated an employer's duty to bargain collectively with the
majority representatives of his employees, section 111.06(1)(d), the
act further provides in section 111.06(1) (e) that it is an unfair labor
practice for an employer "to bargain collectively with the representatives
of less than a majority of his employees in a collective bargaining unit."
By way of clarification the Board has held that an employer is not guilty
of an unfair labor practice where the employer has not yet executed a
collective bargaining agreement, and has broken off negotiations with
the minority group prior to Board certification of the majority group.26
The fact that this particular subsection has literally no effect on
labor-management relations in the state can be seen from the fact that
there is but one Board decision squarely in point.
Section 111.06(1) (e) further states that it is an unfair labor prac-
tice for an employer "to enter into an all-union agreement except in the
manner provided in section (1) (c) of this section."
A number of labor attorneys were questioned relative to the absence
of Board decisions on this section. The general explanation was that
employers are conversant with the representation provisions of the act
so seldom violate this subsection either unintentionally or by design.
f. Violation of the Terms of a Collective Bargaining Agreement.
No one subsection of the unfair labor practice provisions of the act
evoked as many comments during the course of the field interviews as
did section 111.06(1) (f) of the act which makes it an unfair labor
practice for an employer "to violate the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement (including an agreement to accept an arbitration award)."
Actions which may constitute such a violation include failure to pay
23WERB v. International Ass'n., 241 Wis. 286, 6 N.W. 2d 339 (1942).24 Appleton Chair Corp. v. United Brotherhood, 239 Wis. 337, 1 N.W. 2d 188
(1941).
25 Triangle Mfg. Co., WERB Dec. No. 1861 (1948).
2o Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., WERB Dec. No. 342 (1941).
1961]
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wages according to the scale set out in the agreement and failure to
recognize seniority rights.
In setting the framework for an appraisal of this limitation on
employer conduct, it should be kept in mind that, unlike many other
provisions of the act, this particular provision has affected employers
throughout the state. It is not just the marginal up-state employer, but
also the large urban employer who may be called upon to explain his
conduct. Management has been universally outspoken against this pro-
vision, referring to it as "the compulsory arbitration provision of the
act."
In commenting on this particular provision, the act's draftsman said:
This subsection requires every employer to respect his contracts.
It would seem to be a subject on which there should be no dif-
ference of opinion.
2 7
Before discussing the decisions of the Board and judicial determina-
tions, attention should be called to the varying circumstances which give
rise to contests under this provision. Two distinctions may be drawn in
this respect; first, matters arising in smaller communities are generally
of the nature of willful contract violations on the part of small, marginal
employers. Second, matters coming to the Board's attention from the
larger urban areas generally are of the nature of construction of am-
biguous contract provisions. It would appear axiomatic, therefore, that
many of the disputes arising in the former category are "cut and dried"
while a rather sophisticated review of the facts by the Board is neces-
sary in matters arising out of disputes in the latter category.
In view of the large number of cases involved in this area, an at-
tempt is made here merely to pinpoint the troublesome areas.
(1) Form of the contract. The Board has held in two cases28 that a
collective bargaining agreement does not have to be in writing and that
an oral agreement may be enforceable under the statute. However, the
Board clearly held in a subsequent case, Hotpoint, Inc., 29 that a violation
by an employer of an agreement, oral or otherwise, between the employer
and an individual worker concerning working conditions, is not a col-
lectively bargained agreement within the meaning of the act.
(2) Wages, hours, and working conditions. In a number of rather
routine cases the Board has found employers guilty of failure to pay
wages agreed upon. A list of interesting facts are disclosed in those
instances where the Board has found an employer guilty of failing to
pay employees on dates designated as pay days and of issuing checks on
insufficient funds,30 of failing to discuss rates paid to an employee in
27 Cammentary, supra note 10.
28 Kaufman Lunch Co., WERB Dec. No. 1632 (1948), aff'd Milwaukee Co. Cir.
Ct. (1948); Giant Grip Mfg. Co., WERB Dec. No. 2318 (1950).
29 Hotpoint, Tnc., WERB Dec. No. 2122 (1949).
30 C. B. Rich Co., WERB Dec. 3121 (1952).
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violation of an agreement to do so, 31 of instituting a wage incentive plan
without the agreement of the union shop committee and contrary to the
terms of the agreement, 32 of failing to give the union copies of a rate
schedule,3 3 and of failing to pay an employee overtime pursuant to the
contract provisions.
34
In another series of cases the Board held an employer guilty of an
unfair practice in refusing to make payments of retroactive pay due
employees under the terms of an agreement,35 in refusing to grant sever-
ance pay to an employee on discharge contrary to the provisions of an
agreement, 36 in failing to pay employees holiday pay in accordance with
an agreement 3 7 and in failing to make whole an employee wrongfully
laid off.3 8
(3) Refusal to arbitrate and refusal to accept an arbitration award.
During the course of the past 22 years the Board has heard a variety of
cases arising out of the parties' refusal to accept the arbitration award.
In the Madison Bus Company case,39 the Board held that a provision
in an agreement for arbitration of all future disputes is valid and if a
signatory party refuses to submit such dispute to arbitration, it may be
ordered to do so by the Board under section 111.06(1) (f) and (2) (c).
Subsequently the Wisconsin Supreme Court held in Dunphy Boat
Corporation v. WERB 40 that the provisions of the WEPA should be
liberally construed in order to effect the policy of the statute set forth
in section 111.01 of the act, and that the refusal by Dunphy to arbitrate
the dispute under consideration constituted a violation of section 111.06
(1) (f). In passing on an alleged conflict between chapters 111 (WEPA)
and 298 (Arbitration) the court noted:
Sec. 110.10 provides that parties to a labor dispute may agree in
writing to have the WERB name arbitrators to arbitrate the
same, and that the procedure to be followed in such an arbitration
shall be that prescribed in Ch. 298 Stats. We are constrained to
conclude that sec. 111.10 was intended to add to the powers of
the WERB and not to limit and circumscribe the same.
31 Bunde-Upmeyer Dental Lab., WERB Dec. No. 3162 (1952).
32 Morgan Co., WERB Dec. No. 69 (1940).
33 C. M. Tool & Die Co., WERB Dec. No. 1849 (1948).
34 Badger Nu-Way Cleaners, WERB Dec. No. 19 (1939), aff'd, Dane Co. Cir. Ct.
(1939).
35 Sterling, Inc., WERB Dec. No. 1100 (1946); Wausau Motor Parts Co.,
WERB Dec. No. 1369 (1947); Woodland Foundry, Inc., WERB Dec. No.
3252 (1952).
36 Clark's Super Gas Co., WERB Dec. No. 914 (1946).
37 Stone Motors Co., WERB Dec. No. 3331 (1950); C. B. Rich Co., WERB
Dec. No. 3442 (1953); Wisconsin Grey Iron Foundry Co., WERB Dec. No.
3565 (1953).
38 Appleton Machine Co., WERB Dec. No. 2598 (1950).
39 Madison Bus Co., WERB Dec. No. 2083-A (1949).
40 Dunphy Boat Corp. v. WERB, 267 Wis. 316, 64 N.W. 2d 866 (1954).
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In turning to the question raised by the respondent's motion for re-
view, i.e., "that the dispute.., relating to the method of computing the
incentive bonus is not arbitrable," the court was faced with a most
difficult problem. The facts giving rise to the dispute were that the em-
ployer, unknown to his employees, changed the method of computing
the bonus incentive during the year 1949, and in the following year ex-
ecuted an agreement wherein it was stated that there were to be no
changes in the "current practices." Subsequently, an employee caught
the discrepancy and an unfair labor practice charge was filed after the
employer refused to arbitrate the dispute. In supporting the Board's
finding that a reasonable arbitrator might well find the matter arbitrable
and ordering the parties to arbitration, the court took note of the fact
that all of the defenses raised before the Board might be raised by the
respondent before the arbitrator and that it was for the arbitrator to
pass on these defenses rather than the court. 41
Before the Board can order the parties to arbitration, it must appear
from the face of the agreement that the party bringing the unfair labor
practice charge has a right to have his dispute arbitrated under the agree-
ment. Thus the Board found in the Savidusky case 42 that where the
agreement provided that only the union and the employer had the right
to insist on arbitration, the employer did not violate the terms of the
agreement by refusing to arbitrate the demands of an individual mem-
ber.
A more difficult problem was presented in the Cutler-Hammer case.43
Here the Board held that, where a collective bargaining agreement pro-
vided that the employer should have the absolute power to determine
whether a leave of absence should be granted to employees, the em-
ployer did not violate the agreement by refusing to submit to arbitration
the question of whether the employee was entitled to a leave, The con-
troversy arose because the agreement also provided for arbitration in
matters or controversies "arising out of or having to do with or con-
cerning the application, and/or interpretation of any clause or clausing."
As might well be expected, the Board, under the direction of Sec-
tion 111.06 (1) (f), has had occasion to pass on the arbitrability of a
number of disputes. For the most part these decisions might well be
described as "common sense" decisions and need no comment here
apart from stating that organized labor has expressed considerable re-
spect for the Board decisions in these matters. A union president for
a mid-state cartage local stated that, in his opinion, "you pretty much
knew where you stood" with respect to the Board's disposition of a
41 For an excellent discussion on the enforcement aspects of the state act, see:
Comment, 1957 Wis. L. REv. 136.
42 Savidusky's, Inc., WERB Dec. No. 475 (1943), aft'd, Dane Co. Cir. Ct. (1943).
4 Cutler-Hammer, Inc., WERB Dec. No. 1476 (1947).
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matter brought under this section, and also that "the Board called its
shots as it saw them" in this area.
It is of particular interest to note that with one exception 44 unions
have not resorted to this section to enforce contractual provisions re-
lating to "job ownership" or "job control." This would seem to indicate
that organized labor prefers to settle its own jurisdictional problems
without resort to the Board's offices.
Two observations should be made before summarizing the effect of
this subsection. First, the Board has taken the position that it will not
lend its offices to the enforcement of an illegal contractual clause. Hence,
in the Henry case45 it held that the employer had committed no violation
of the act in subcontracting work to a contractor not a party to an "illegal
industrywide" agreement requiring the use of union labor. Second, the
Board has insisted that an employee exhaust his contractual remedies
before seeking Board relief under this subsection.
4
"
Subsection 111.06(1) (f) has been very popular with union business
agents throughout the state, for it affords them an inexpensive forum
for disposition of many of the small grievances which comprise a sig-
nificant portion of their duties. As elective officers, business agents are
concerned with obtaining some measure of satisfaction for their con-
stituents; and as one stated, "In a good share of cases getting the thing
settled is more important than who wins." Furthermore, business agents
are not unmindful of the fact that their ability to appear on behalf of
an aggrieved employee without counsel reflects favorably on their ability
"to get the job done for the boys." Several indicated during the inter-
view that they prefer to keep control of the "case" rather than relinquish
it to either local counsel or counsel for the international "who may see
it in a different light."
g. Non-recognition or Non-acceptance of an Award. Subsection
111.06(1) (g) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to re-
fuse or fail to recognize or accept as conclusive of any issue in any con-
troversy as to employment relations the final determination (after ap-
peal, if any) of any tribunal having competent jurisdiction of the same
or whose jurisdiction the employer accepted." This particular subsec-
tion should be read with subsection 111.06(1) (f) above, in that they
both afford labor administrative relief for contract violations rather
than requiring, it to seek judicial relief.
Research into the background of the act has brought nothing to light
which would indicate why this subsection was included in the Peace Act,
in view of its absence from the WLRA. Its inclusion does suggest a
tacit awareness on the part of those responsible for the act's passage
44American Electrotyping Co., WERB Dec. No. 63 (1940), aff'd, Milwaukee
Co. Cir. Ct. (1940).
45Frank J. Henry, Inc., WERB Dec. No. 3849 (1954).
46 Wisconsin Motors Corp., WERB Dec. No. 3943 (1955).
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that employers are just as susceptible to the temptation to refuse arbitra-
tion awards as are unions.
Even the comments of the act's draftsman, usually a source of some
illumination, offer little help in this instance:
This subsection requires the employer to abide by the decisions
of the Board or the court on appeal. This also is something
which should not require any argument in its support. There is no
similar provision in the present law.
4 7
While there is no legislative history of the act available to consult in
connection with the wording "of any tribunal having competent juris-
diction of the same," it would appear that in utilizing this language the
draftsman intended to include the decisions of the WLRB. This view is
supported by the fact that the orders and determinations of that body
were not expressly nullified by the repeal of the WLRA. In addition to
the decisions of the Board and judicial review thereof, this section covers
decisions of arbitrators and arbitration boards where their jurisdiction
has been accepted by the employer.
Precisely what was meant by the language "refuse or fail to recog-
nize or accept" is not clear. It is generally believed by both labor and
management that this subsection does not apply to those instances in
which an employer in good faith makes a post-election statement regard-
ing the union's strength, which statement is not intended to undermine
the union. Thus, should an employer after an election state that he feels
that the successful local is inappropriate for the representation of his
employees, such a statement would not appear to be a violation of sub-
section 111.06(l) (g).
Several leading Board decisions are of value in contrasting the
Board's function in this area with what the parties believe to be the
Board's function. In commenting on the finality of an arbitration award
in the Le Roi case 48 the board held that an employer's refusal to accept
an arbitration award did not constitute a violation of this subsection in
that the award had been appealed to the circuit court and no determina-
tion had been made as of that date. In another decision handed down
the same year, the Board found that, while it was in disagreement with
the award of the arbitrator, the Board was powerless to upset the award
since the parties had submitted to the arbitrator's jurisdiction.49
Without attempting to touch too closely on the interesting problems
posed by wartime regulations, a noteworthy case should be considered.
In interpreting subsection 111.06(1)(g), the court held in Allis-Chal-
mers Ianufacturing Company50 that the employer's refusal to accept
4 Commentary, supra note 10.
48 Le Roi Co., WERB Dec. No. 1465 (1947).
49 Wisconsin Axle Division, WERB Dec. No. 1467 (1947).
50 Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. WERB, 254 Wis. 484, 37 N.W. 2d 36 (1949).
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an award of the War Labor Board, after having stipulated to its juris-
diction, constituted a violation of this subsection.
In passing on the finality of an award, a state circuit court in a
1951 case51 held that the board was powerless to hear anew a dispute
where the employer, in compliance with the parties' agreement, accepted
and fully complied with an award, thereby rendering the matter res
judicata and precluding a hearing de novo by the board.
In passing on the competency of the tribunal, the board in both the
Sterling case and the Briggs & Stratton case52 held that an alleged fail-
ure by an employer to comply with the directives of the War Labor
Board, in instances where the employer had not voluntarily accepted its
jurisdiction, was not an unfair labor practice within the meaning of
subsection 111.06(1)(g). In asserting its reason for so holding, the
board stated that, "The War Labor Board was not deemed to be a
tribunal of competent jurisdiction to conclusively determine the issues
under any controversy between the parties, since its orders were ad-
visory and did not create any legal rights or impose legally enforceable
obligations upon either of the parties."
The over-all impact of subsections 111.06(1)(f) and (g) is not
easily stated. Certainly it has had the effect of affording organized labor
swift administrative relief in those instances in which employers have
either refused to resort to the arbitration of a dispute as agreed upon or
failed to abide by the award of a competent tribunal. Initially this pro-
tection was of universal importance to labor throughout the state. As
particular unions and locals have grown in strength, these provisions
have become less important to them. For, they may, in given instances,
choose to use their economic strength to afford them that which is se-
cused to them by the act.
Management, on the other hand, reflects its over-all attitude to-
ward the unfair labor practice provisions of the act by its dislike of
these particular subsections because they afford labor an opportunity to
seek adjudication of disputes without resort to the courts in the first
instance.
As opposed to similar charges which they might bring against or-
ganized labor, management's desire to have those unfair labor practice
charges brought against them tried by a court in the first instance stems
from a variety of reasons. First, management realizes that the process
of judicial determination is considerably slower than administrative
determination so the time element involved may thwart labor's purpose
in filing charges. Second, management has bad greater occasion in the
past to use the services of attorneys and in many instances may have a
51 Universal Foundry Co., Winnebago Co. Cir. Ct., (1951).
52 Sterling, Inc., WERB Dec. No. 889 (1946); Briggs & Stratton Corp., WERB
Dec. No. 958 (1946).
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legal department within the organization, which reduces the costs in-
volved in litigating a dispute. Third, courts have been traditionally re-
luctant to find employers guilty of unfair labor practices, particularly
when such a finding would necessitate the award of back pay.
In summary, it would appear that these subsections are of great
importance to organized labor, particularly in those instances in which
a local lacks sufficient strength to enforce its demands for arbitration
and acceptance of the resulting award.
h. Discharge or Discrimination Against an Employee Filing Charges.
Subsection 111.06((1) (h) is designed primarily to protect an employee
who has filed an unfair labor practice charge against his employer. It
is an unfair practice for an employer to:
discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because
he has filed charges or given information or testimony in good
faith under the provisions of this subchapter.
The provision differs only slightly from section 111.08(4) of the
WLRA, which provided that it was an unfair labor practice for an
employer to:
discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because
he has signed or filed any affidavit, petition or complaint or given
any information or testimony in support of this chapter.
In commenting on this particular provision of the Peace Act and the
comparable provision of the WLRA, the act's draftsman noted the sub-
stantial similarity between the two, but observed that:
[The Peace Act] adds the condition that the activities of the em-
ployee must have been conducted 'in good faith.' It would seem
that there would be no objection to this added condition. Surely
an employer should not be required to keep in his service an em-
ployee if, for example, the board has held that he was guilty of
perjury in making the charges against his employer.53
In practice this particular subsection has not been controversial. The
first charge filed upon which the board was officially to act came in 1946
when the board held in Sheboygan Dairymen's Co-operative54 that the
discharge of one employee and the demotion of another, for giving in-
formation and testifying in a prior proceeding, constituted a violation
of this subsection.
A number of union spokesmen were questioned in an effort to es-
tablish why so few charges are brought under this section. The con-
sensus was that ample subtle methods of discrimination are available
to an employer, none of which could appropriately serve as a basis for
unfair labor practice charges. As a member of the union bargaining
53 Commentary, supra note 10.
54Sheboygan Dairymen's Co-operative ASS'n. WERB Dec. No. 1012 (1946),
aff'd, Sheboygan Co. Cir. Ct. (1947).
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committee in an upstate industry indicated, "In the absence of a strong
union to back up an employee, the boss may well make employment
elsewhere attractive." This opinion reveals the paradox of this section.
Where organized labor is strong and has less need for protection, the
act provides the greatest protection. Conversely, where a local is just
getting established in a plant and needs the maximum protection, its
members may not be able to take advantage of that afforded by the act
because of their insecure position.
Over-all it would appear that this subsection has had little direct but
substantial indirect effect on labor-management relations, according to
the information reported above.
i. Deduction of Dues or Assessments Without Authority. Section
111.06(1) (i) makes it an unfair practice for an employer to:
deduct labor organization dues or assessments from an em-
ployee's earnings, unless the employer has been presented with an
individual order therefor, signed by the employee personally, and
terminable at the end of any year of its life by the employee
giving at least 30 days' written notice of such termination.
It should be stated at the outset that, notwithstanding all that has
been written concerning the importance of the check-off system, those
representatives of organized labor interviewed had little comment re-
garding this particular directive of the act. Historically, however, the
drafting of this particular subsection was said to be very troublesome.
Individuals present during the drafting sessions leading up to the pub-
lic hearings on the bill indicated that management was especially out-
spoken in criticism of this provision; many were of the opinion that no
check-off system should have been allowed.
Walter Bender said in discussing this provision:
This subsection deals with the much disputed question of the
'check-off.' Here again the council has sought to adopt a fair
middle ground between the demands of certain employers that
the check-off should be outlawed entirely and the demands of
extremists on the side of labor who contend that the check-off
should be permitted without any restrictions, whatsoever. The
bill endeavors to adopt a position which will again make the real
will of the employee the determining factor.55
In view of the fact that the sponsors of the act were aware of the
composition of the legislature and their own ability to obtain passage of
far more stringent legislation, it may seem strange that the act provides
for any check-off. The answer revealed through the interviews is that
the council was primarily concerned with curbing "abuses" and not
in "breaking unionism." Hence it is not strange that the state's farm
55 Colnmientary, supra note 10.
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interests were not particularly concerned with the check-off system,
which finds its greatest application in the large shops of metropolitan
communities.
Although unpopular with organized labor, this section appears to
be amply clear since there has been no formal board decision interpret-
ing the provisions of subsection 111.06(1) (i).
j. Employment of Labor Spies. It is an unfair labor practice for an
employer to "employ any person to spy upon employees or their repre-
sentatives respecting their exercise of any right created or approved by
this subchapter." 56 In commenting on the brevity of this subsection Mr.
Bender noted:
This subsection is very similar to the corresponding subsection
of the present law save that there is not included ...the pro-
hibition forbidding the employer to 'keep under surveillance,
whether directly or through agents or any other person' the ac-
tivities in question. These words have been omitted because of
their indefiniteness. A charge might well be made that an em-
ployer (under the wording of the WLRA) in merely walking
through his plant in a proper endeavor ...was attempting to
exercise some measure of surveillance. 57
k. Use of a Blacklist. Subsection 111.06(1)(k), prohibiting the
making or use of blacklists (lists of individuals associated with union
activities, circulated among employers for the purpose of denying em-
ployment to those listed thereon), similarly has had little impact on la-
bor-management relations in Wisconsin. There are no formal board
decisions interpreting this provision. The brevity of this subsection is
emplained by the fact that Wisconsin has another, more comprehensive
statute prohibiting this type of activity.51
1. Commission of Crimes or Misdemeanors in Connection with Dis-
putes Arising Out of the Employment Relationship. The concluding
restriction on employer conduct makes it an unfair practice for an em-
ployer to "commit any crime or misdemeanor in connection with any
controversy as to employment relations." Although no affirmative state-
ment was uncovered which would cast any light upon the inclusion of
this restriction, there is evidence that it was included to "balance out"
a similar provision regarding labor's conduct. A question was asked
during the course of the interviews designed to elicit information on
the effect of this provision and its counterpart, subsection 111.06(2) (j)
(covering similar conduct on the part of labor), on violence in labor
disputes. The majority of those interviewed chose to answer the ques-
tion solely with respect to the effect on organized labor. This response
is understandable in view of the fact that there is only one board de-
56WIs. STAT. §111.06(1) (j) (1957).
5 Commentary, supra note 10.
58 Wis. STAT. §134.02 (1957).
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cision holding an employer guilty under this particular subsection. In
this case, National Pressure Cooker,59 the board found the employer
guilty of an unfair labor practice in that he had violated a statute0 by
advertising for employees without stating the existence of a strike.
Here again it would appear that this subsection has had little impact
on labor-management relations. However, it should be noted that whether
this provision is utilized depends on inclinations of individual counsel-
a number were of the opinion that charges filed under the subsection
were "useless in that people just do not regard corporations as guilty
of criminal acts." Others actually were unaware that such a provision
even existed.
Summary. By and large labor has expressed only qualified satis-
faction with the coverage of subsection 111.06(1). Many labor spokes-
men regard it as having secured only limited protection to organized
labor. Others have expressed the belief that the provisions of this sec-
tion should be "brought up to date, realizing that violence and counter-
violence are no longer dominant factors in labor-management relations."
2. Employee Unfair Labor Practices. We have already noted that
the Peace Act departed from the usual pattern of labor legislation in the
"thirties" in that it sets forth a series of unfair labor practices restricting
the activities of labor. We shall now turn to an analysis of the specific
limitations on employee conduct. These limitations are set forth in
section 111.06(2). It should be recalled that similar provisions were
not incorporated into federal labor legislation until 1947, although con-
siderable pressure to amend the Wagner Act was exerted on Congress
by agricultural interests.6 1
The Council supported these limitations on employee conduit by
arguing that "they [labor] cannot rightly object to accepting the re-
sponsibilities which should rest upon them for refraining from those
acts which constitute unfair labor practices and thus do their part to
insure the maintenance of industrial peace."
The draftsman, Walter Bender, described the necessity for the "em-
ployee" unfair labor practice provisions thus: "Labor organizations in
this country are no longer in their infancy and should not have immu-
nity from a proper share of responsibility. No one has put this more
clearly than Mr. Justice Brandeis when he said:
This practical immunity of the unions from legal liability is
deemed by many labor leaders a great advantage. To me it ap-
pears to be just the reverse. . . . It creates on the part of the
employer, also, a bitter antagonism, not so much on account of
the lawless acts as from a deep-rooted sense of injustice, arising
59 National Pressure Cooker Co., WERB Dec. No. 3686 (1954).
60 WIs. STAT. §103.43 (1959).
61 Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§151-166
(1958).
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from the feeling that while the employer is subject to the law,
unions are in a position of legal irresponsibility....
"The greatest criticism of our present labor legislation is that it is en-
tirely devoted to providing special privileges, special immunities to labor
groups and labor activities and is entirely silent in reference to their
responsibilities....
"It has sometimes been suggested that labor unions should be in-
corporated. The council has not made any such requirement in the
present bill because it does not believe that such a requirement would
meet the necessities of the situation." 62
Mr. Bender continued that in his opinion the problem could only be
met by setting up standards of conduct for employees just as there had
been standards of conduct for employers under the WLRA. In support
of this position, he expressed the view that organized labor should find
this approach far more tenable than accepting the obligations which in-
corporation would place on them.
a. Coercion or Intimidation of an Employee. The first employee un-
fair labor practice enumerated by the act makes it a violation of the
statute for any employee individually or in concert with others to "co-
erce or intimidate an employe in the enjoyment of his legal rights, in-
cluding those guaranteed in section 111.04, or to intimidate his family,
picket his domicile, or injure the person or property of such employe
or his family." 63
The key words in this section are "coerce or intimidate" and a size-
able body of case law has developed interpreting what constitutes either
in a given instance. However, before proceeding to a discussion of these
points, we must consider the extent to which one party is made re-
sponsible for the act of another. The court held in 1943 in the Allis-
Chalmers case64 that the union was responsible for the acts of its presi-
dent in demanding under threat of strike that the employer discharge
a non-member in violation of the act; similarly the union was re-
sponsible for the acts of its members in acts of violence against non-
member employees and in the continuous solicitation of employees
against their will. Conversely, the board held that a trade council and
its business agent were not guilty of an unfair labor practice where they
neither directed, ordered, controlled not ratified picketing by employee
member.65
In defining coercion and intimidation the court in the Allis-Chalmers
case found that to constitute an unfair practice within the meaning of
the act the conduct need not have accomplished its purpose. In both the
62 Cammentary, supra note 10.
63 WIs. STAT. §111.06(2) (a) (1959).
64 Christoffel v. WERB, 243 Wis. 332, 10 N.W. 2d 197 (1943).65 Wausau Building Trades Council, WERB Dec. No. 2193 (1949).
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Sears Roebuck case6 6 and the Philip Parish case67 the court held that
coercion or intimidation of an employee need not take the form of vio-
lence because a man may be coerced or intimidated through fear or loss
of wages as well. It has also been held that false accusing an employee
of the commission of a criminal offense,68 calling an employee offensive
names and epithets,60 continuous union solicitation of employees over
the objections of said employees,7 0 physical violence and threats there-
of,7 1 threatening employees with punishment if they failed to engage
in unlawful work stoppages 7 2 and following the vehicles of employees
and engaging in physical attacks on the occupants73 constitute examples
of coercion and intimidation within the meaning of subsection 111.06
(2) (a). Other examples of conduct held to be prohibited are the picket-
ing of homes of employees who have continued their employment dur-
ing the course of a strike ;74 picketing and boycotting a retail store, where
the employees had declined to join the union, for the purpose of forcing
them to join ;75 threat of loss of unemployment for the purpose of in-
timidating non-union employees to join the union ;76 and causing the
discharge of an employee because he had been suspended from union
membership, in the absence of a valid "all-union" agreement.7 7
It is to be noted from the cases cited that the board does not at-
tempt to differentiate between physical and non-physical coercion or
intimidation. The resultant effect of the pressure on the employee or
his family and not the manner in which it is utilized is the determining
factor. A number of union spokesmen interviewed indicated that this
lack of differentiation has handicapped organized labor in its organi-
zational activities.
No one conversant with organizational techniques can deny that a
certain amount of "pressure" is always present in any organizational
situation. Thus, from a practical standpoint it is difficult to see how the
board is in a position to announce a rule of thumb which will clarify the
66Retail Clerks' Union v. WERB, 242 Wis. 21, 6 N.W. 2d 698 (1942).
67 Philip Parish, Rock Co. Cir. Ct., (1951).6 8Wausau Bldg. Trades Council, WERB Dec. No. 2193 (1949).
69 Western Leather Co., WERB Dec. No. 287 (1941).70Wausau Bldg. Trades Council, WERB Dec. No. 2193 (1949).
72-Ibid.
72 International Union v. WERB, 250 Wis. 550, 27 N.W. 2d 875 (1947), aff'd,
336 U.S. 245 (1948).
73 Marathon Electric Mfg. Corp., WERB Dec. No. 3141-A (1952), aff'd, Mara-
thon Co. Cir. Ct. (1952); Fred Rueping Leather Co., WERB Dec. No. 4049(1955), aff'd, Fond du Lac Co. Cir. Ct. (1955).
74 Western Leather Co., WERB Dec. No. 287 (1941) ; Kohler Co., WERB Dec.
No. 3740 (1954); Fred Rueping Leather Co., WERB Dec. No. 4049 (1955),
aff'd, Fond du Lac Co. Cir. Ct. (1955).
75 Retail Clerks' Union v. WERB, 242 Wis. 21, 6 N.W. 2nd 698 (1942) ; Wisconsin
Liquor Co., WERB Dec. No. 685 (1944), aff'd, WERB v. Retail Clerks Inter-
national Union, 264 Wis. 189, 58 N.W. 2d 655 (1953).
76 Christoffel v. WERE, 243 Wis. 332, 10 N.W. 2d 197 (1943); St. Joseph's
Hospital, WERB Dec. No. 3142 (1952), aff'd, Ashland Co. Cir. Ct. (1952).
77 Milwaukee Novelty Dye Works, WERB Dec. No. 127 (1940).
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situation. This problem is enhanced by the fact that the board does not
have any practical discretion in accepting or rejecting charges filed un-
der this subsection. It must hear and pass upon all charges which ap-
pear from a review of the complaint to have substance.
In an attempt to clarify just what the legislature intended to accom-
plish in the enactment of subsection 111.06(2) (a), several individuals
active in the legislature in 1939 were interviewed. Two of these, who
guided the act through the Assembly and Senate respectively, corrobo-
rated the view of the Board by indicating that the members of the legis-
lature intended that this subsection cover both physical and nonphysical
coercion and intimidation.
A current example of charges filed under this subsection and the
board's method for disposing of them is to be found in the nationally
famous "Kohler situation" involving a dispute originating in 1954 and
continuing up to the present between the United Auto Workers and the
Kohler Plumbing Company. This discussion will not attempt to pass
on the factual question of whether the acts charged actually occurred.
The company filed a complaint; the board scheduled a hearing and took
testimony. Less than one week after the hearing date the board issued
a formal order 78 finding that union members had violated section
111.06(2) (a) by picketing the domicile of persons desiring to work at
the Kohler Company. The finding was accompanied by a cease and de-
sist order directing the union to refrain from such conduct in the future.
The majority of those interviewed during the course of this study
were aware of the board's action in the above matter and voluntarily
commented on it. For the most part, they felt that the union had "lost
the strike" as a result of losing control over the plant gates, not because
of any limitations on its conduct resulting from the board's decision. 79
b. Coercion or Intimidation of an Employer. Section 111.06(2) (b)
makes it an unfair labor practice for an employee individually or in
concert with others to
coerce, intimidate or induce any employer to interfere with any
of his employees in the enjoyment of their legal rights, including
those guaranteed in section 111.04, or to engage in any practice
with regard to his employees which would constitute an unfair
practice if undertaken by him on his own initiative.
Examples of conduct prohibited under this section include the in-
ducement of employers to hire only union members in the absence of
a valid "all-union" agreement, and the inducement of employers to
coerce employees into joining a given union or to vote a certain way in
either an election or referendum proceedings.
78 Kohler Co., WERB Dec. No. 3740 (1954).
79 That same order, in addition to limiting coercive conduct under §111.06(2) (b),
limited the number of pickets at any one gate and the total number of pickets
which might be present at the plant at any one time.
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According to one individual the degree of compulsion necessary to
establish the fact of inducement is particularly troublesome. There is
a thin line between inducement and what one employer termed "an
awareness as to the facts of life."
While management has expressed general satisfaction with this sub-
section, organized labor is contemptuous of it.
We turn now to a discussion of specific types of conduct covered
by section 111.06 (2) (b).
(1) Inducement to discharge pursuant to illegal agreement. Perhaps
the most interesting of the numerous cases dealing with the problem is
Wisconsin Motors Corporation.80 Here the court held that union in-
volved committed an unfair practice in inducing the employer to enter
into an illegal contract which provided for maintenance of membership
and the recognition of work permits, and the discharge of employees
who were neither members of the union nor holders of work permits.
(2) Picketing and boycotting. The decisions of the board with re-
spect to picketing by a union in violation of subsection 111.06(2) (b) of
the act fall roughly into three categories. In the first, the union pickets
the employer in an attempt to induce him to recognize the union and to
enter into a collective bargaining agreement. The decisions of the board
and the determinations of the courts are clear in regard to this type of
activity; a union, in the absence of a strike vote, violates the act by
picketing an employer for recognition. Such a situation arises where
either (a) the union approached the employees, or (b) where the union
represents a significant portion of the employees of the employer, but as
of the date of the prohibited activities has not been certified by the board.
In both cases the conduct prohibited does not turn on the coercion of
the employees, but rather on "any practice with regard to his employees
which would constitute an unfair labor practice if undertaken by him
[the employer] on his own initiative."
The second situation arises where the picketing is conducted for the
purpose of compelling the employer to coerce his employees, who have
previously declined to join the union, into joining the union. The most
recent example of this type of union activity is to be found in the Vogt
case.8' Here the union had previously approached the employees of the
primary employer on several occasions and had been unsuccessful in per-
suading them to join the union.82 Somewhat later the union picketed the
employer with the result that truckers refused to deliver supplies to the
employer. On rehearing, the Wisconsin Supreme Court found the ac-
tivities in violation of subsection 111.06(2)(b), in that the picketing
80 International Union v. WERB, 245 Wis. 417, 14 N.W. 2d 872 (1944).
81 International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284
(1957).
82 Note, 1958 )ris. L. REv. 154.
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was for an unlawful purpose, and the United States Supreme Court
on certiorari upheld the decision of the state supreme court.
This case was discussed with a number of persons conversant with
the facts giving rise to this dispute. Many of the facts warrant an opin-
ion that the element of coercion was not present in union's picketing
of Vogt.8 3 Regardless of the facts in the case, it now appears that peace-
ful organizational picketing may be enjoined when it is in violation of
section 111.06 (2) (b) of the Wisconsin Statutes.
The third example of union activity which has been held in violation
of this subsection is picketing conducted for the purpose of inducing an
employer to enter into an "all-union" agreement in the absence of a
supporting ref erendum.84
In sum it would appear that this subsection has had a greater effect
on labor-management relations than any other provision of section
111.06(2). Each board decision holding labor guilty of an unfair labor
practice under this subsection has, in effect, reduced labor's ability to
organize and recruit new strength. Labor spokesmen are particularly
critical of this provision of the statute. They maintain that, in their
opinion, this provision has cost the unions "what we consider to be a
normal yearly increase in membership." Both local officers and union
counsel maintain that some degree of compulsion is necessary to "meet
the pressures which management can bring to bear." The prohibition,
under board interpretation of coercion, of the "unfair list"85 and "ap-
proved list"8 6 are frequently cited examples of the "unfair nature of
the act."
Moreover labor is quick to point out that, "We simply cannot afford
in terms of either time or money to organize under the restrictions
placed on us by the act."
c. Violation of the Terms of a Collective Bargaining Agreement.
Subsection 111.06(2) (c) makes it an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployee individually or in concert with others to "violate the terms of
a collective bargaining agreement (including an agreement to accept
an arbitration award)." A comparable section, 111.06(1) (f), was dis-
cussed supra. Unlike its decisions under the latter, the board's decisions
under this section are far less numerous and compartmentalized. Un-
fortunately, the field interviews did not reveal any particular informa-
tion surrounding the inclusion of this subsection in the act, apart from
83 There was considerable evidence disclosed by the interviews to suggest that
the union's immediate purpose in picketing the employer was to answer the
demands of the organized employers of the region "that something be done
about Vogt" and that the union had little hope of organizing Vogt's employ-
ees either by coercion or other means.
84 Poole & Poole, WERB Dec. No. 286 (1941); Joseph Landres, WERB Dec.
No. 2135 (1949), aff'd, Brown Co. Cir. Ct. (1950).
85 Sheboygan Sausage Co., WERB Dec. No. 1410 (1947).86Louise R. Branger, WERB Dec. No. 2339 (1950).
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a general observation that "it was felt that there was need for such a
provision based on employers' past experience with labor."
Under the board's interpretation, this subsection covers oral agree-
ments just as does subsection 111.06(1) (f). 7 Similarly, before a union
can be found guilty of violating the terms of an agreement to arbitrate,
the board must find that the question raised by the dispute is one sub-
ject to arbitration under the contract.8 8 Should the agreement under
which the employer seeks redress contain a controlling cause in violation
of the act, the board has held that, again as under subsection 111.06
(1) (f), it will not enforce such a clause.8 9
In general, provisions of this subsection have had little effect on
labor-management relations in Wisconsin. Although the yearly average
may vary, generally the board receives from five to six times as many
cases brought against employers as against either employees or their
bargaining representatives. During the course of the interviews both
labor and management displayed little interest in discussing this sub-
section.
d. Non-recognition or Non-acceptance of an Award. The attitude
of both labor and management on subsection 111.06(2) (d) (failure to
recognize or accept an award), is much like their attitude on the previ-
ous section-neither has displayed any interest in it. This lack of inter-
est is undoubtedly due in part to the fact that the board has not been
called upon to make any determinations under this provision.
Those specifically questioned on the dearth of charges filed against
labor under this provision indicated that "labor has displayed a greater
willingness to take the gloves off after a fight" and so has tended to
accept as conclusive the awards of both the board and the courts.
e. Picketing, Boycotting or Striking in the Absence of a Strike Vote.
The provisions of subsection 111.06(2) (e), which are extremely com-
plex, make it an unfair labor practice to:
Co-operate in engaging in, promoting or inducing picketing (not
constituting an exercise of constitutionally guaranteed free
speech), boycotting or any other overt concomitant of a strike
unless a nmjority in a collective bargaining unit of the employees
of an employer against whom such acts are primarily directed
have voted by secret ballot to call a strike. [Emphasis added.]
(1) Right of minority to strike. In describing the Council's purpose
in seeking passage of this provision and its relation to the right of the
minority to strike, the draftsman noted:
[The] right to strike is preserved to employees, but this subsec-
tion provides that unless and until a majority of the employees
87 Baldwin Plywood and Veneer Co., WERB Dec. No. 3161 (1952).88 Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co., WERB Dec. No. 2371 (1950).
89 Parsons Bros., WERB Dec. No. 2945 (1951).
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in a collective bargaining unit have voted to strike, coercive
measures against the employer, such as picketing, boycotting,
etc., shall not be permissible. . . . [Reasonable] protection, not
only of the employer but what is more important of the public
itself, requires that the employer and the enterprise should be
free from such coercive measures when there is no such majority
sentiment in favor of a strike.90
The above argument is not unusual considering that the act was
passed in 1939, a year associated with the depression and concern on
the part of the public over labor disputes and their effect on the de-
pressed economy. What is surprising is the further argument that:
If [coercive] measures are permitted on the initiative of a mi-
nority of the employees in a collective bargaining unit, then they
must be permitted on such initiative no matter how small that
minority may be. That means that we are permitting a minority
of the employees in such a unit, no matter how small it may be,
to adopt measures that injure the majority of the employees.
- . . This section does not prohibit a minority, no matter how
small, from striking. It only prohibits such minority from doing
those further acts in connection with the strike which injure the
other interests involved.91 [Emphasis added.]
Thus it appears that the draftsman intended that the statute pro-
hibit the minority only from engaging in, promoting or inducing picket-
ing, boycotting or other concomitant acts; but not from striking, i.e.,
peaceful, concerted refusal to work. Certainly, no problem is presented
when a minority undertakes to picket or boycott their employer in that
these acts have been held a violation when performed by a majority of
employees in the absence of a strike vote. 92
This view of the right of the minority to strike was initially sup-
ported by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Hotel & R.E.I. Alliance v.
WERB 93 where the court held:
Par. (e) by its terms does not apply to the individual.... It does
not forbid an employee singly or in concert with others from
bringing about a vote by a collective bargaining unit as to whether
there shall be a strike. By the act strikes are divided into two
classes,-authorized and unauthorized. . . . It is the act of co-
operating in engaging in, promoting or inducing picketing, boy-
cotting, or other overt acts in support of an unauthorized strike
that par. (e) declares to be an unfair labor practice. ...
We find nothing in the act which prevents a minority of a col-
lective bargaining unit from withdrawing from employment either
90 Commentary, supra note 10.
91 Ibid.
92 See Appleton Chair Corp. v .United Brotherhood, 239 Wis. 337, 1 N.W. 2d
188 (1941).
93 Hotel & R.E.I. Alliance v. WERB, 236 Wis. 329, 294 N.W. 632 (1941), aff'd,
315 U.S. 437 (1942).
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singly or in concert. They are not guilty of an unfair labor prac-
tice in so doing.
Without passing on the nature of the prohibited coercive acts, the
court noted they will, of necessity, have to be determined in each in-
stance by board review or recourse to either legal or equitable relief.9 4
Subsequent board decisions sustained by the court have cast doubt
on the right of a minority to strike, since by so doing they may be held
to have performed some overt act concomitant of a strike. One of the
leading cases in this area is Briggs & Stratton Corporation.9 Here the
court, in passing on the legality of the "quickie strikes," stated:
It is to be noted that par. (e) involves cooperation in engaging
in overt acts concomitant of a strike. Walking out and refrain-
ing from work, and not appearing for work for the purpose of
exerting economic pressure are plainly concomitants of a strike,
and so doing is an overt act. Co-operation in so doing by plainest
implication is prohibited unless the majority of the employees of
the collective bargaining unit by secret ballot have voted to go
on strike.
The net effect of this decision appears to be this: an individual em-
ployee may with impunity withhold his services; a group of employees
not representing a majority may not, for by so doing they may be held
to have performed an overt act concomitant of a strike. The board has
not had occasion to pass squarely on this situation, but there is every
indication that a minority under these circumstances might well be held
guilty of an unfair practice.
(2) Right of the majority to strike. Under the provisions of sub-
section 111.06(2) (e) it appears amply clear that the majority of the
employees in a collective bargaining unit are free to strike provided that
they have expressed their wish to do so in a secret strike vote. The
secret ballot referred to in the statute is not conducted under Board
supervision, nor does the statute provide for the manner in which the
balloting is to be conducted apart from the fact that the balloting is
to be done in secret.
A further restriction on strike activities is to be found in section
111.11(2), wherein employees of an employer engaged in harvesting
perishable farm commodities or dairy produce are required to give at
least 10 days notice to their employer of an intention to strike.
In summary, this particular subsection has evoked considerable
criticism from organized labor. Interestingly enough, however, labor
itself is split as to the effect of this particular provision on labor-man-
agement relations. Spokesmen for several of the larger unions believe
94 Id. at 347, 294 N.W. at 640.
95 International Union v. WERB, 250 Wis. 550, 27 N.W. 2d 875 (1947), aff'd,
336 U.S. 245 (1947).
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that this provision has been used "to further restrict labor's use of
economic force both for organization activities and to enforce bargain-
ing demands." Conversely, several union officers were of the opinion
that this subsection has had little or no effect on their activities since
"we always take a strike vote as a matter of course."
f. Hindering and Preventing Work and Travel. Subsection 111.06
(2) (f) makes it an unfair labor practice for employees individually or
in association to:
hinder or prevent, by mass picketing, threats, intimidation, force
or coercion of any kind the pursuit of any lawful work or em-
ployment, or to obstruct or interfere with entrance to or egress
from any place of employment, or to obstruct or interfere with
free and uninterrupted use of public roads, streets, highways,
railways, airports, or other ways of travel or conveyance.
Undoubtedly this particular subsection has been one of the more
troublesome aspects of the act. Management has repeatedly argued that
the public has a legitimate interest in free access to the public thorough-
fares. Although management has not spoken to organized labor's argu-
ment concerning unrestricted access to the public way, this fact does not
mean that these instrumentalities automatically become neutral in a
labor dispute.
The attitude of Wisconsin agriculture in the late thirties toward
conduct prohibited by this subsection is stated in the following:
This subsection is aimed at those practices which have most often
led to scenes of violence in labor disputes. It is activities of this
type which are referred to at the outset of this bill, when it de-
clared that the public policy of the state is to substitute the 'proc-
esses of justice for the more primitive methods of trial by com-
bat.' . . . The methods which it forbids are not those which labor
as a whole can for a moment countenance. They are the methods
of the racketeer and the thug.
96
As may be seen from the language, the prohibited conduct applies to
not only the employees of the struck employer but also to the employees
of other employers. Thus, when charges are filed with the board indi-
cating a violation of the act, the board has jurisdiction over all who
participate in the prohibited conduct.
Although board decisions in this area may be categorized by the
facts which gave rise to the dispute in question, e.g., hindering or pre-
venting work, obstructing entrance to or egress from place of work and
obstructing roads, a somewhat different treatment may afford greater
insight into the problems presented by this subsection. Both the applic-
able decisions and comments recorded fall roughly into three categories:
96 Commentary, supra note 10.
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problems presented by (1) prohibited mass picketing, (2) permissible
mass picketing and (3) "non-mass" picketing.
(1) Prohibited mass picketing. Prohibited mass picketing is that
type of picketing which has as its purpose the prevention of a lawful
pursuit through intimidation, force or coercion. Thus, an excessively
large number of pickets concentrated in a given area, regardless of their
conduct, may support a finding that their presence itself constitutes
some measure of intimidation or coercion. Where this type of activity
is carried on for the purpose of hindering or preventing work or em-
ployment, a party bringing charges must show some causal connection
between the mass picketing and the inability of employees to perform
their duties. On the other hand, where charges are brought against ac-
tivities designed to obstruct travel, the fact that the activities are so
designed is enough to support the board's finding that the act has been
violated.
The majority of the employers polled indicated that they felt mass
picketing per se should constitute a violation of the act regardless of
the purpose for which it was being conducted. Labor on the other hand
indicated universally that it felt that the prohibitions on mass picketing
were unnecessarily strict and "far from realistic." In amplification,
several union officers stated that if management is to have the free use
of the highways to break a strike, labor should have a similar privilege
to utilize the highways for effecting their objective. The intensity with
which a given union officer argued his position was dependent in part
on the trade with which he was associated. Thus a teamster indicated
that, in his opinion, the state's highway system was the situs of the dis-
pute involving the cartage industry.
(2) Permissible mass picketing. Permissible mass picketing is that
type of mass picketing which has as its objective a lawful purpose, not
inconsistent with the over-all direction of the statute. An example of
such activity is to be found in Western Leather97 wherein it was held
that the mass picketing of all the plant gates by the union was for the
purpose of demonstrating union solidarity and improving the "em-
ployees' working condition" and, therefore, not in violation of subsec-
tion 111.06(2)(f). It is to be noted that in this instance the Board
specifically found that "such picketing did not obstruct or interfere with
entrance or egress to the plant."
(3) Non-mass picketing. "Non-mass" picketing is that picketing,
whether permissible or not, which can be conducted by more than one
individual, but which does not partake of group activity. While sheer
numbers may contribute to its function or success, numerical superiority
is not the controlling factor. Some insight into the nature of permissible
97 Western Leather Co., WERB Dec. No. 287 (1941).
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"non-mass" picketing may be found in examining the board's decision in
Edward Konop,98 a matter involving the union's picketing of a small
barber shop. Here the board found that the union's picketing of the
employer's place of business after it had removed the union shop card
was permissible. This action was considered valid because the union
had made no attempt to coerce or intimidate the employer, his em-
ployees, or his prospective customers. In support of its conclusion, the
board noted that the picketing under review was for the purpose of
advising the public that the employer's shop was no longer operated as a
union establishment. Similarly, in a case concerning "height of postwar
labor unrest," the board held that certain acts did not constitute an
unfair labor practice in the absence of threats or the use of force. The
acts in question were the flagging down of cars and trucks containing
both prospective employees and those engaged in delivering materials
to the plant. These practice was done for the purpose of advising them
that a strike was in progress. 99
Management on the whole has been rather critical of this section.
At least one corporate officer has stated that he fails to see how the board
can pass judgment on the effect which picketing may have on customers,
i.e., whether or not the mere presence of pickets is coercive in the ab-
sence of threats or violence. Labor spokesmen on the other hand have
shown broad appreciation for the distinction between permissible and
non-permissible activities in this area.
Summary. Once rapport has been established between the inter-
viewer and a local union official, one has the feeling that the provisions
of subsection 111.06(2) (f) have not been as damaging to labor activi-
ties as many spokesmen for organized labor would have the public be-
lieve. One union officer indicated in confidence that "these provisions
[subsections 111.06(2) (e) and (f) ] allow us to keep a firm hand on our
people with the result that violence has been kept down." Still another
union officer volunteered that "we do not know too much about the
board decisions [in this area] ; however, under the act we think that we
pretty well know how far we can go and what to tell our people." Both
these individuals indicated that a "strike situation is difficult" in that
the "membership" of the union cannot always be counted upon to re-
frain from all acts prohibited by statute.
Management, asked to comment specifically on the effect of subsec-
tion 111.06(2)(f) on labor-management relations, indicated a feeling
that the act has had "qualified success in this area." Many expressed the
belief that "prompter action is needed in boycott cases" and that "no
degree of violence should be permitted."
98 Edward Konop, WERB Dec. No. 1505 (1948).
99 Foster-Lethman Mills, WERB Dec. No. 1343 (1947).
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g. Engaging in a Secondary Boycott, and Hindering or Preventing
the Obtaining, Using or Disposing of Materials, Equipment or Services.
Incorporated into the act is a sweeping restriction on the use of the sec-
ondary boycott; under subsection 111.06(2) (g) it is an unfair practice
for employees as individuals or in concert with others to:
engage in a secondary boycott; or to hinder or prevent, by
threats, intimidation, force, coercion or sabotage, the obtaining,
use or disposition of materials, equipment or services; or to com-
bine or conspire to hinder or prevent, by any means whatsoever,
the obtaining, use or disposition of materials, equipment or
services....
Section 111.02(12) defines a secondary boycott to include:
combining or conspiring to cause or threaten to cause injury to
one with whom no labor dispute exists ... in order to bring him
against his will into a concerted plan to coerce or inflict damage
upon another.
The records of the Agricultural Council indicate that the primary
purpose for which this subsection was drafted was to afford protection
to the small retailer with no direct interest in the outcome of a given
labor dispute. In view of the fact that secondary boycotts against smaller
retailers were particularly effective in the late thirties, it is not surpris-
ing that the act should contain such a provision. Farm groups were well
aware that many small retailers, rather than risk the loss of business
resulting from a secondary boycott, would refuse to handle farm pro-
duce processed by non-union labor. Several spokesmen for the co-opera-
tive movement in Wisconsin indicated in interviews that this fear was
"heightened by the knowledge that the average retailer is by no means
dependent on a given supplier and that in many instances he can operate
just as competitively in merchandising items produced by union labor."
In order to understand the restrictions imposed by this section, the
definition of a labor dispute set forth in subsection 111.02(8) is also
important:
The term 'labor dispute' means any controversy between an em-
ployer and the majority of his employees in a collective bargain-
ing unit concerning the right or process of details of collective
bargaining or the designation of representatives....
Since a labor dispute is thus limited to a majority of the employees
and their employer, a dispute between a minority of the employees and
their employer or the majority group may well come under the pro-
hibition of 111.06(2) (g).
In turning to what constitutes a secondary boycott within the pro-
hibitions of this section, picketing the place of business of a customer
of an employer, although ostensibly directed against the employer's
19611
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delivery trucks, would appear to fall within the prohibition. 00 In A. L.
Weiss'01 the union was found guilty of an unfair labor practice under
section 111.06(2) (g) in engaging in a secondary boycott of an apart-
ment building. However, in a decision involving almost identical facts 0 2
the board held that the union clearly did not commit an unfair labor
practice in picketing a building, per se, with incidental inconvenience to
the tenants.
The board's decisions interpreting acts designed to hinder or prevent
the obtaining, using or disposing of materials, equipment and services
are less easily comprehended. For example, in Lester L. Leistiko,1'0 a
union representative, in requesting an employer dealing with a non-
union trucker to cease doing business with the trucker, was not held to
have violated this subsection. The court pointed out that there was no
evidence that the employer was in fact prevented from doing business
with the trucker by reason of threat, intimidation, or force. However,
less subtle union pressure'0 4 upon an employee to discontinue patronizing
a non-union employer under threat of loss of employment was held to
violate this provision. Actual physical restraint of employees or goods
also have been held clearly in violation of the act.
Before turning to the comments recorded during the course of field
interviews, it should be noted that this subsection does provide "that
nothing herein shall prevent sympathetic strikes in support of those in
similar occupations working for other employers in the same craft."
This proviso has not received extensive interpretation by either the
Board or the courts, and its over-all impact is not clear. Presumably, it
was included to permit members of the AFL engaged in a similar trade
to support their fellow workers through concerted activities. In practice,
however, it appears to have had little, if any, effect. The majority of the
parties interviewed chose not to comment on this particular aspect of
111.06(2) (g).
Perhaps no other area of the act is as inaccurately portrayed by a
review of board decisions as is subsection 111.06(2) (g). First, in many
instances the secondary boycott is an institution born of necessity and,
therefore, not easily regulated. Its continued presence on both the na-
tional and state scenes needs no comment. Second, it is worth noting
that "only the crudest attempts to enforce a secondary boycott are
brought to the board's attention."
The history of the secondary boycott in its most obvious forms is
well known. In commenting on the act's inability to cope with the vari-
ous forms which a secondary boycott may take, an individual recently
200Accord, WERB v. Milk Union, 238 Wis. 379, 299 N.W. 31 (1941).
101 A. L. Weiss, WERB Dec. No. 1368 (1947).
102 Lauson Investment Co., WERB Dec. No. 2363 (1940).
103 Lester L. Leistiko, WERB Dec. No. 146 (1941).
104 Milwaukee Novelty Dye Works, WERB Dec. No. 127 (1940).
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stated that only rarely does a business agent attempt to call union em-
ployees off a job on which non-union labor is being used.
The majority of those interviewed felt that the act had been rela-
tively ineffective in limiting the use of the secondary boycott. Both labor
and management indicated that they felt that any attempt by either fed-
eral or state legislation to regulate its use is destined to fail. Both labor
and management called attention to the experience of the NLRB in its
attempts to regulate this type of conduct. In general it appears that
subsection 111.06(2) (g) is regarded as one of the least successful pro-
visions of the act by both labor and management.
h. Unauthorized Possession of Property and Interference wuith Pro-
duction. Subsection 111.06(2) (h) of the act forbids labor:
To take unauthorized possession of property of the employer or
to engage in any concerted effort to interfere with production ex-
cept by leaving the premises in an orderly manner for the purpose
of going on strike.
(1) Unauthorized possession of property. At the time of the enact-
ment of the Peace Act, the so-called "sit-down" strikes of the mid-
thirties had largely run their course in Wisconsin. Therefore, these pro-
visions have not been construed by the board in passing on charges
arising out of such a strike. There is, however, little doubt as to the
draftsman's intention when he included in the act the language, except by
leaving the premises in an orderly manner for the purpose of going on
strike." It is noteworthy that the two board decisions in the area of un-
lawful acts of possession occurred shortly after the act was passed. In
Creamery Package Company0 5 the board found the union guilty of an
unfair practice in picketing the plant and in refusing to allow the em-
ployer's representatives entrance except on three occasions during a five-
week period. In a matter decided a month later'016 the board held that
the picketing employees had in effect taken unauthorized possession of
the plant by refusing to company officers and non-strikers access to the
plant in question.
The absence of litigation in this area was explained by one labor
attorney as resulting from (a) the attractiveness of other means of en-
forcing labor's demands, and (b) a greater responsiveness on the part
of labor to public opinion.
(2) Interference with production. Although the act prohibits cer-
tain conduct amounting to sabotage or damage to the employer's physi-
cal plant during the course of a labor dispute, there are no reported
board decisions covering such occurences. The forces which prompted
enactment of the legislation were discussed with several of its sponsors.
105 Creamery Package Co., WERB Dec. No. 117 (1940).
106 Spring City Foundry Co., WERB Dec. No. 126 (1940), aff'd, Waukesha Co.
Cir. Ct. (1941).
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Invariably, damage to the employer's property during the course of a
strike was listed as one of the factors which "focused attention on
the need for curative legislation." When questioned as to how fre-
quently the Board is confronted with charges of willful damage to an
employer's property, a representative of the Board indicated that such
charges are few and far between. In the most recent example of such
alleged damages, involving an upstate creamery co-operative in the fall
of 1957, charges were not filed, yet, this incident did strain relations
between the employer and the union.
As for charges filed under this subsection against conduct designed
to impede production, it has been held unlawful for a union to adopt
by-laws setting forth predetermined standards of production.1 0 7 In an-
other case a less subtle approach was held in violation of the act when
the Board found that the union had directed a "slow-down" for the
purpose of reducing the plant's output.1° 8
Summary of Subsections 111.06(2)(f), (g) and (h). It should be
noted that these subsections are of particular importance to organized
labor, not only historically but currently. The failure or success of many
strikes hinges on the ability of labor to close the plant down physically,
to impose an effective secondary boycott on the products of the employer
and to, in effect, control the plant. During the course of field inter-
views, attorneys for both labor and management indicated that control
of the plant gates is crucial. There is ample evidence available from a
study of Wisconsin labor disputes in the past two decades to substanti-
ate this position.10 9
Control of the plant is more than just economic strangulation of the
employer; it is an awesome showing of union solidarity and authority.
It commands both the respect and obedience of the uncommitted worker
who is torn between catracism and the "weekly pay check." It is perhaps
for this reason that attorneys for both sides, as distinguished from labor
and management spokesmen, displayed considerable willingness to dis-
cuss plant gate "strategy."
Apart from the specific impact which these three subsections have
had on labor-management relations, there is proof that in the over-all
picture, these restrictions have severely curtailed organized labor's
ability to strike on its own terms once a given plant has been organized.
A secondary effect of these limitations has been to make strike vio-
lence more abhorrent in the eyes of management. Frequently, in dis-
cussing these three subsections, management stated that a particular
type of conduct was wrong because "the act states that it is wrong."
This is one of the not too rare examples of management's adoption of
107 American Dry Cleaners et al, WERB Dec. No. 2723, 2724, 2732, 2734 (1951).
los Stolper Steel Products Corp., WERB Dec. No. 2109 (1949), aff'd, Interna-
tional Union v. WERB, 258 Wis. 481, 46 N.W. 2d 185 (1950).20 9 Kohler Co., WERB Dec. No. 3740 (1954).
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legislative standards of conduct as standards of conduct applicable to
industry. Organized labor has been quick to sense this and is often
heard to complain that, "under the act the standards of conduct are
those of a group of farmers and not of the industrial area."
On the whole it appears that these three subsections have caused
organized labor particular concern and often form the basis for labor's
criticism of the "one-sidedness" of the act.
i. Failure to Give Notice of Intention to Strike. The Peace Act
under subsection 111.06(2) (i) makes it an unfair practice "to fail to
give notice of intention to strike provided in section 111.11." In prac-
tice, unions tend to file their notice of an intention to strike at the be-
ginning of negotiations with the covered industries and thereby negate
the protection afforded by this subsection.
j. Commission of Crimes or Misdemeanors in Connection with Dis-
putes Arising Out of the Employment Relationship. Section 111.06
(2) (j) makes it an unfair labor practice for employees collectively or
singly to "commit any crime or misdemeanor in connection with any
controversy as to employment relations." This subsection has its coun-
terpart in subsection 111.06(1) (1), prohibiting similar conduct on the
part of employers. Such acts as physically blocking the entrance to an
employer's premises, and in so doing committing a misdemeanor, con-
stitute a violation of this subsection. 10 Likewise, physical assault to
either the employer, his employees or local law enforcement officers
would be held to be conduct of a prohibited nature.-"
Management, on the other hand, has been extremely complimentary
in appraisal of this particular provision. Only one attorney for manage-
ment indicated he felt that this provision could profitably be repealed.
Spokesmen for management itself indicated that the processes of crimi-
nal law were far too slow, and that in given instances enforcement
agencies and local courts are reluctant to act. When confronted with
these arguments, labor hastily countered with the suggestion that the
answer lies in correcting the deficiencies in both law enforcement agen-
cies and courts, rather than adding to the duties of the board.
1. Engaging in Jurisdictional Strikes."2 Subsection 111.06(2)(1)
makes it an unfair labor practice for employees individually or in con-
cert with others "to engage in, promote or induce a jurisdictional strike."
This provision has been of little importance and as of the completion
of this study the board has not been called upon to render a decision
under it.
3. Acts Done in the Interest of Another. Section 111.06(3) makes
it an unfair labor practice for any person to do anything on behalf of
1X0Accord, Creamery Package Co., WERB Dec. No. 117 (1940).
"'. See: Marathon Electric Mfg. Corp., WERB Dec. No. 3141 (1952) ; Milwaukee
Nash, WERB Dec. No. 3275 (1952).
12 The statutes contain no §111.06(2) (k).
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either labor or management which is prohibited by the act. This subsec-
tion is seldom invoked.
CONCLUSION
Considerable difficulty is experienced in passing judgment on what
effect the unfair labor practice provisions of the Act have had on labor
management relation. Taken alone any given prohibition on the con-
duct on the part of either labor or management may seem unrealistic
and excessive. Considered as a whole the legislative directives of section
111.06 assume quite a different posture. A mere meaningful test might
be to ask whether Wisconsin has enjoyed greater or lesser industrial
peace than adjacent states. However, such a determination must await
further study.
Perhaps it should be noted in conclusion that Wisconsin has no
right-to-work law nor has there been any real demand for one. What
the future holds for the W.E.P.A. must of necessity remain a matter
of conjecture. However, high on the list of questions which remain un-
answered is whether the multitudinous restrictions of the Act afford
the board sufficient leeway in interpreting the Act in the light of current
problems.
In sum it would appear that the Act, and the unfair labor practice
provisions in particular, have contributed to the day-to-day adjustment
inherent in industrial relation. Thus, the Act as a whole has tended to
implement the state's policy to encourage collective bargaining in its
broadest sense. Certainly, in many respects it has been a remarkable
piece of legislation and has displayed considerable tenacity in remaining
on the statute books. (To be concluded in Volume 45, Number 3, of the
Marquette Law Review.)
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